Poverty evaluations differ from welfare evaluations in one significant aspect, the existence of a threshold or reference point, the poverty line. It is therefore possible to build up normative evaluation models in which comparisons are made taking distances from this reference point rather than from the origin to be ethically relevant. This is the case in our model of poverty comparisons over heterogeneous populations, which focuses upon poverty gaps and not incomes. When poverty lines differ for the different groups in the population, choosing poverty gaps instead of incomes as the relevant indicator brings in normatively appealing classes of poverty indices not previously accommodated. For these indices poverty comparisons are implemented through sequential poverty gap curves (or poverty gap distributions) dominance. These novel conditions are logically related to those suggested in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) for welfare comparisons, and can also be grounded firmly upon those of Bourguignon (1989) . The proportion of poor individuals in the society and their average poverty gap play a role in our comparisons, though not in the existing poverty dominance criteria for heterogeneous populations. Various intermediate poverty dominance conditions and a generalization of the poverty gap approach are also investigated.
Introduction
Consider two "poor" income units (e.g. households) with different ethically relevant non-income characteristics (e.g. needs). Now consider the two following statements:
(A) The social marginal utility of income is higher for the needier unit if experiencing the same, or a lower, income level than the less needy unit.
(B) The social marginal utility of income is higher for the needier unit if experiencing the same, or a higher, poverty gap than the less needy unit.
Both statements seem reasonable, and turn out to be equivalent if the poverty line is independent from the ethically relevant non-income characteristics, or if trivially we consider households which are homogenous in non-income characteristics. However, poverty lines are often implicitly set in order to take into account non-income characteristics; in particular, higher poverty lines are typically associated with higher levels of need. Then statements A and B turn out not to be equivalent any more. Shall we look at income levels, or at shortfalls from relevant reference points (e.g. poverty lines), in order to make normative statements (e.g. poverty evaluations)?
Our treatment of poverty comparisons over heterogeneous populations in this paper highlights some implications of following these different statements. The existing results in the poverty measurement literature within the heterogeneous setting are derived, without exception, by following approach A; we concentrate here on approach B, making comparisons based on shortfalls from reference levels (i.e. poverty gap levels). Once this new perspective is adopted, the ensuing dominance conditions differ significantly from any of those already presented in the literature. Not least, for a fixed set of poverty lines, the proportion of poor in the society, and their average poverty gap, both play roles in our dominance comparisons. Surprisingly, this is not the case for any of the existing poverty dominance criteria in the heterogeneous case.
In order to evaluate aggregate poverty we consider additively decomposable poverty measures, defined over a population comprising subgroups that are homogeneous in terms of needs and can be ranked according to them. Individual poverty contributions are measured as the feeling of deprivation felt by income units under the poverty line when they compare their situation to the one of being non poor, that is, of having an income level at or above the poverty line. In order to take into account the differences in needs, instead of adopting cardinal equivalence scales, we follow the approach pioneered by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) for welfare comparisons and Atkinson (1992) for poverty comparisons. Namely, we consider distributions of non-equivalized (money) income, and appropriate poverty lines, and then identify restrictions on evaluation functions that express normative judgements about the relative impact of income changes for differences in income units' non-income characteristics.
In the paper, we also allow some flexibility in the assumed poverty lines. In this, we adhere to the traditions of the existing poverty literature. First, in the homogeneous case, Atkinson (1987) , Foster and Shorrocks (1988a,b) , Jenkins and Lambert (1997) and Zheng (1999) all allow latitude in the poverty line to be set. Second, in the needs-based studies of Atkinson (1992) , Jenkins and Lambert (1993) , Chambaz and Maurin (1998) and Duclos and Makdissi (1999) , poverty orderings are provided that are consistent with a variety of views about the respective poverty lines for different needs groups. But, we contend, there are three questions facing the poverty analyst, not just two, in case of social heterogeneity: 1. What is the level to assign to the poverty line z? For this purpose we can think of defining a basic level of standard of living, say α, and allow for the setting of an income value which, given the characteristics of the income units, enables them to reach this basic level. Of course people's opinions could conflict about both the definition of standard of living and the procedure to follow in order to measure it.
2. How do poverty lines z i change across needs groups, call these i = 1, 2, ..., n? This follows on from the previous point. Even if agreement is reached in respect of the minimum level of standard of living α, then disagreement could occur when we consider the procedure to follow to assign to it an income level z i conditional on needs i. It is natural to think that higher needs require higher incomes in order to lead to similar standards of living, i.e. z i ≥ z i+1 if we assume that groups are ranked in decreasing order w.r.t. needs.
3. How does deprivation, which everyone agrees should be measured in terms of shortfalls from the poverty line z i − x (where x is the income of a poor income unit), differ across groups? Indeed, how should we compare shortfalls between income units belonging to different groups?
The emphasis on shortfalls, as in question 3, has not to our knowledge been addressed before for heterogeneous populations (though it is common enough in the homogeneous case: just consider Sen (1976) and Foster et al. (1984) ). The approach we follow is very much in line with that suggested by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) , as we explain shortly, but there is a crucial difference: our marginal utility comparisons across groups are made at fixed absolute poverty gap levels rather than fixed income levels, as there.
As a consequence of this difference in focus, the sequential poverty dominance results we obtain are different from those in Atkinson (1992) , Jenkins and Lambert (1993) , Chambaz and Maurin (1998) , Zoli (2000) and Duclos et al. (2003) . They are expressed in terms of distributions of poverty gaps and of absolute poverty gap profile (APGP) curves, introduced by Spencer and Fisher (1992) , Jenkins and Lambert (1997) and Shorrocks (1995 Shorrocks ( , 1998 . 1 Nevertheless, the procedure is very similar in spirit to the one for checking welfare dominance, advocated by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) using generalized Lorenz curves. Our paper in fact provides a corresponding rationale for using APGP curves in sequential analysis. Before moving to the analysis of our dual view, we remark upon the issue which goes to the heart of the distinction between ours and all the other approaches. Who should be the "equals" for poverty analysis? In what situation are two income units with different needs "equally poor"? Not until this question is answered, surely, can we say which income units of a needier type are socially more deserving (as in statements A and B, with which we began).
Consider briefly what would be implied for poverty analysis by the adoption of a specific set of relative equivalence scales, call them e 1 , e 2 , ....e n (where, say, e n = 1, taking the least needy type n as the reference type), and a minimum standard of living (equivalent income) α. Then z i = αe i and in equivalent income space there is a common poverty line for all needs groups of α. The normative judgement for a relative equivalence scale is that those with the same equivalent income are the equals. If amounts of real income dx i and dx j were to be given to two equals, one of type i and the other of type j > i, the impact on poverty would be larger (smaller) for the needier income unit if dx i /z i > (<) dx j /z j , and would be the same if dx i /z i = dx j /z j . In equivalent income space, then, needs are fully taken care of by equivalizing; in that space, a common increment to the income of any member of an equals group has the same effect; there is no distinction between A and B -indeed, no call for a heterogeneous machinery.
Statements A and B both concern the relative impacts of a transfer of the same amount, but they differ in identifying the comparable sets of income units across groups. Statement A considers as comparable two units experiencing the same absolute income level, while for statement B, the comparable units have the same absolute poverty gap. The fundamental normative judgement underpinning B is that the differential poverty impact of a real income transfer should be (weakly) larger when applied to a needier household for a fixed poverty gap. If we add the assumption that the impact of a transfer on poverty deprivation decreases as income increases, for any given type, then a fortiori the differential poverty impact of a real income transfer is larger when applied to a needier household with a bigger poverty gap, too: we arrive at the full statement in B. A similar argument works with A.
Consider Figure 1 , in which for the case n = 2, an income x 2 is labelled, of a poor household belonging to the less needy group. What households in group 1 might be included in the comparability set for x 2 ? For approach A, the comparable households have income x 0 1 = x 2 , whilst for approach B, the comparable income is x 1 , the one that yields the same poverty gap as x 2 . Assuming that the impact of a transfer on poverty deprivation decreases as income increases, type 1 income units with less than x 0 1 (respectively, x 1 ) would a fortiori be regarded as more deserving of additional resources than x 2 ; those with more than x 0 1 (respectively, x 1 ), less so. One can see that identifying the "poverty equals" of x 2 as those with x 0 1 (approach A) or 1 , x 1 ] could serve; in particular, the income marked in Figure 1 as x r 1 could, which has the same relative poverty gap as the original x 2 . We return to this issue at the end of the paper.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the notation and technical preliminaries in terms of which the analysis will proceed. In Section 3, we obtain our main theorems, linking poverty dominance for defined classes of poverty indices with sequential poverty gap dominance conditions. Here we also discuss the issue of checking dominance when poverty lines z i vary within ranges, indicating algorithms that allow comparisons to be made for a variety of such cases. In Section 4, we make connections with existing poverty and welfare literature, showing in particular that when poverty lines are allowed to change without restrictions on upper and lower bounds, the poverty gap dominance conditions boil down to the one presented in Bourguignon (1989) . We also explain here a specific sense in which our dominance criteria may be considered "more conservative" -that is, to give higher relevance to needs -than those of Atkinson (1992) . Finally, in Section 5 we show how corresponding results may be obtained by extending the logic from absolute to relative poverty gaps. Section 6 concludes. Most of the technical results will be proved in the Appendix using a series of Claims.
Preliminaries and notation
We will consider poverty comparisons between income distributions over heterogeneous populations partitioned into groups of individuals homogeneous in non-income characteristics. The discrete population is composed of m income units and is par-titioned into n non overlapping and exhaustive population subgroups i = 1, 2, ..., n ranked in decreasing order in terms of needs. Each subgroup i consists of m i > 0 income units, i.e. P i m i = m. The income profile of group i is represented by the
) where x i l ≥ 0 denotes the income level of income unit l = 1, 2, ..., m i belonging to group i. The profile of the overall population is represented by the m-dimensional vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x i , ..., x n ). The set of all these m-dimensional vectors is denoted by X m , and we denote X := ∪ m>1 X m .We denote by F i (x) the cumulative income distribution of subgroup i of population F for i = 1, 2, ..., n. The population share of individuals belonging to group i is denoted by q
where F (x) is the cumulative income distribution function of an income profile with support [0, +∞) and finite mean µ(F ) = R +∞ 0 xdF (x). Let F be the set of all such cumulative distributions s.t.
The poverty indices we consider are monotonic increasing transformations of the class of additively decomposable poverty indices
where
is the individual poverty deprivation function for income units with income x in group i whose poverty line is z i > 0. Note that since P (F ) is defined over distribution functions it is within-group anonymous and population replication invariant. That is, poverty evaluation within each subgroup depends only on the income distribution and on the group's poverty line and is not affected by the identities of the income units within the subgroup i.e. is invariant w.r.t. permutations of the income profiles
). Furthermore the poverty evaluation is invariant w.r.t. replications of the income profile x, where to each individual is associated a finite number of "clones".
Let
showing the income of an individual at the p population quantile of the distribution of group i. Correspondingly F −1 (p) will represent the left continuous inverse of F (x). Let γ F (p, z) be the "absolute poverty gap profile" of the censored distribution F evaluated at the p quantile of the income distribution of the total population, for a given poverty line z. That is
we denote by π the proportion of poor individuals in the population (i.e. π = F (z)) it will follow that γ F (j/m, z) = 0 for all j/m > π. The absolute poverty gap profile (APGP) curve is the cumulated curve of the absolute poverty gaps:
This curve (in its relative formulation, taking into account relative poverty gaps) has been introduced in poverty analysis by Spencer and Fisher (1992) , Jenkins and Lambert (1997) and Shorrocks (1995 Shorrocks ( , 1998 
, where H(F, z) is the headcount ratio of distribution F and I(F, z) is its average absolute income gap.
In order to compare our results to those existing in the literature we present here the classical Sequential Poverty Dominance (SPD) conditions suggested in Atkinson (1992) , Jenkins and Lambert (1993) and Chambaz and Maurin (1998) . Given the ranking of needs between groups, we suppose that the vector z ∈ R n ++ of poverty lines is ranked in non-increasing order, i.e. z i ≥ z i+1 . The set of all these vectors of poverty lines is denoted with Z n . We will write F < SP D(j) [z] G to denote that distribution F dominates G according to the SPD condition of order j = 1, 2. These comparisons are made for a given vector of ordered poverty lines z ∈ Z n . The definition for SPD is presented here for the general case where marginal distributions of needs may differ.
Definition 2 (Sequential Poverty Dominance ) For z ∈ Z n and F, G ∈ F :
These are sequential stochastic dominance conditions of the type suggested in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) where comparisons at each stage k are restricted to income levels below the poverty line z k . For example, take the case k = 2, poor individuals in the neediest group with incomes within the range (z 2 , z 1 ] are not considered. They are, of course, considered at the first stage of comparison. That is, only individuals in group j with sufficiently low income are considered at the stage k > j.
According to the new criterion we shall introduce, by contrast, at each stage k of comparison all of the poor individuals in groups j ≤ k play a role. The following example illustrates a situation where SPD conditions lead to a counter-intuitive result.
Example 1 Consider the income profiles x and y, each defined over the same population comprising two subgroups with different needs. Let the respective distribution functions be F and G, and let the incomes be as follows (denoting subgroups by superscripts 1 and 2):
Further suppose that the poverty lines are z 1 = 7 and z 2 = 5. Note in respect of the first subgroup that (1, 3, 6) first order stochastically dominates (0, 2, 4). Note also that, merging all the individuals in subgroups 1 and 2 with incomes at most 5 = z 2 , (0, 1, 3, 4, 4) first order stochastically dominates (0, 1, 2, 4, 4). From these two observations it follows that F < SP D(1) [7, 5] G. However 5/6 of the population in y is poor while in x all individuals are poor.
From the example is clear that although x dominates y according to SP D(1) it may include also a proportionally larger number of poor individuals. The head-count ratio is the most common crude poverty indicator. It is surprising that the partial order SP D(1) devised to accommodate a variety of views about poverty without imposing any concern for "poverty-intensity" and "poverty-inequality" turns out not to be consistent with the headcount ratio. 2 The following example provides a similar result where SPD(2) conflicts with the average poverty gap indicator evaluated over the entire population.
Example 2 Following the same notation introduced in the previous example, consider the income profiles x and y (with distribution functions respectively F, and G) where:
Suppose that the subgroups poverty lines are z 1 = 9 and z 2 = 7. Then F < SP D(2) [9, 7] G but the average poverty gap in y is 5 = (21 + 9) /6 while in x it is 31/6 = (18 + 13)/6 which is larger.
The main results
As a starting point we assume that it is possible to specify a profile of poverty lines z = (z 1 , z 2 , ..z i , ..z n ) ∈ Z n ranked in non-increasing order such that poverty deprivation 2 The inconsistency between SPD(1) and the head-count ratio has been pointed out by Atkinson (1992, p.8) (see also Duclos and Makdissi, 1999) . According to Atkinson the head-count ratio is ruled out from the set of poverty measures considered by the assumption of continuity of p i (x, z i ) at x = z i , and therefore it should not play a role in the dominance conditions. We will show that even if p i (x, z i ) is continuous at x = z i , the headcount ratio (or its version considering the proportion of strictly poor individuals) will play a role in the new dominance conditions. The result is due to the change in perspective to comparisons made at poverty gap levels instead of income levels.
is eliminated for all individuals with income levels at or above the relevant poverty line and for higher level of needs at least as much income is required to achieve a minimum standard of living.
For a given poverty line z i and income level x the individual deprivation function p i (x, z i ) can be expressed in terms of absolute poverty gaps z i − x * , where x * denotes income censored at level z i . That is
where u i (.) is such that u i (0) = 0 for all i. For a poverty gap γ such that
the function u i (γ) may depend also on z i . If u i (γ) is independent from z i , this generates the class of additively decomposable poverty indices expressed in terms of poverty gaps. This is a subset of the class of poverty indices considered in Spencer and Fisher (1992) , and Chakravarty (1983 Chakravarty ( , 1983a . Indices included in this group are those of Foster et al. (1984) , obtained for
α when homogeneous populations are considered and poverty is evaluated in absolute terms. The headcount ratio, i.e. the proportion of poor individuals in the society, is not included in the class of indices considered. We would require u i (0) = 1 for all i so that for this index p i (x, z i ) is discontinuous at x = z i .
Characterization of Poverty Indices
Policy makers may have different opinions about z ∈ Z n (see points 1 and 2 in the introduction) and/or the function u i (.) (see point 3). We will first consider a fixed vector z and derive dominance conditions based on reasonable assumptions on u i (.). Then, we will extend the analysis in order to allow for possible changes in z, and we will show that if the changes in poverty lines satisfy some restrictive assumptions it is possible to implement simplified procedures that allow to extend the poverty comparisons for a fixed poverty lines profile to the case where poverty lines may change.
The following assumptions make clear the normative value judgements we apply in order to allow partial comparisons of deprivation felt by individuals belonging to different groups, making use of ordinal information on needs. We consider functions u i (γ) that are continuous and twice differentiable. 3 The standard assumption on u i (.) when poverty is evaluated over homogeneous populations is that u i (.) is non-decreasing and convex in the poverty gap level, equivalently poverty satisfies respectively the weak monotonicity property requiring that a decrease in income of a poor individual should not reduce poverty, and the weak Principle of Transfers requiring that as a result of a progressive income transfer poverty should not increase. That is, for u i (γ) assumed twice differentiable, u Property A u i (γ) ≥ 0 for all γ > 0, and u i (0) = 0, for all i = 1, 2, ..., n.
This property requires that perceiving a positive shortfall γ w.r.t. the poverty line is not beneficial for an individual's well-being, thereby inducing a positive level of individual poverty. The ensuing properties introduce the assumptions imposed on between-group comparisons of changes in poverty gaps.
, and all i = 1, 2, ..., n − 1.
Changes in income show a greater effect on the well-being of an individual with a given poverty gap the higher is the level of needs. The needier is an individual, the higher is the positive impact on his/her deprivation of a loss in income for a fixed level of poverty gap.
We introduce two axioms here, in respect of a poverty measure P (.) defined as in (1) , which correspond to property A1. When between groups comparisons are taken into account we impose the restriction of identical marginal distributions of needs in order to separate the issue of group importance (in terms of needs) from the one of group size.
Axiom 1 (WM Weak Monotonicity) For all distributions F, G ∈ F such that F is obtained from G by reducing the income of a poor individual, P (F ) ≥ P (G).
is obtained from G through a reduction δ > 0 of the income of an individual at poverty gap γ > 0 in group i (resp. j) P (F ) ≥ P (F 0 ). P (.) satisfies Axioms WM and BGP if and only if u i (γ) satisfies property A1. See Zoli and Lambert (2005) for the demonstration of this and many subsequent mathematical assertions, which shall be suppressed from this paper for economy and ease of presentation.
The next property allows to compare, between individuals in different groups, the marginal effect of transfers at fixed poverty gap levels.
The differential impact of increases in poverty gaps between individuals with different needs increases as their shortfalls w.r.t. the poverty line increase. Consider a progressive transfer of δ > 0 occurring between individuals in group i where the donor experiences the poverty gap γ and the receiver has poverty gap γ + ε where ε > 0, and a similar transfer involving individuals in group j > i. Requiring that both transfers have a non increasing effect on the groups' poverty and that the poverty reduction effect cannot be lower for the transfer occurring in the needier group we get A2. As for A1, we can also couch these properties axiomatically.
Axiom 3 (WPT: Weak Principle of Transfers) For all distributions F, G ∈ F such that F is obtained from G through a regressive transfer involving poor income units, P (F ) ≥ P (G).
Axiom 4 (BGTP: Between Group Transfer Priority
is obtained from G through a regressive transfer δ > 0 from an individual at poverty gap γ + ε > 0 to an individual at poverty gap γ > 0 both in group i (resp. j) P (F ) ≥ P (F 0 ). P (.) satisfies Axiom WPT and BGTP if and only if u i (γ) satisfies property A2. 4 Note that properties A and A1 imply that u i (γ) ≥ u i+1 (γ) for all γ ≥ 0. Moreover, if we add to these properties the requirement of WPT, i.e. if u 00 i (γ) ≥ 0, then if poverty lines are set such that z i ≥ z i+1 it will follow that for all i = 1, 2, ..., n − 1 and all
As a result dominance for all poverty indices satisfying A, A1 and WPT will be implied by dominance for all indices based on poverty deprivation
This class of indices is considered in Atkinson (1992) . As will emerge, it is larger than the class of those satisfying A, A1 and WPT in that it is possible when z i > z i+1 to construct individual deprivation functions that satisfy the previous condition but not A1. As a result the dominance conditions SPD(1) derived in Atkinson (1992) , Jenkins and Lambert (1993) and Chambaz and Maurin (1998) will imply those obtained for poverty indices satisfying A, A1 and WPT and therefore also those satisfying A, A1 and A2.
Aggregate Poverty Comparisons
The poverty deprivation content of distribution F is P (F ) where
[compare (1)]. This measure can be interpreted as the average well-being shortfall from a minimum standard of living. The poverty deprivation differential between income distributions F and G is given by ∆P :
We can now set out the first proposition, specifying the conditions for first degree sequential poverty deprivation dominance. This is a reference-based dominance concept. We use this terminology throughout, whenever the conditions we derive resemble standard stochastic dominance criteria but instead of checking dominance at each income level for all groups, they check for dominance at income levels associated with the same poverty gap in each group. When comparisons are made over subgroups under the assumption of the same poverty line in each group, the conditions are the same as for standard stochastic dominance, but when poverty lines differ the conditions are modified: instead of comparing subgroup distributions at each income level we compare distributions F i (z i − γ) at each poverty gap level γ ≥ 0. If marginal distributions of needs differ between income distributions then the distribution functions considered will be weighted according to the population share of the group. Formally, let
denote the proportion, over the entire population in F , of individuals belonging to group i whose poverty gap is not-lower than γ, and similarly for G. Furthermore let γ * denote the highest poverty gap in any subgroup. Given that incomes are non-negative and
Definition 3 (RBD: Reference Based SPD) For z ∈ Z n , and F, G ∈ F:
The condition RBD(1) is a first-degree stochastic dominance condition where comparisons are made at levels of poverty gaps. As long as we consider only the first group (k = 1) the dominance condition corresponds to q
Therefore the first stage of the "reference-based" dominance coincides with the standard first degree Sequential Poverty Dominance condition [i.e. SPD (1)]. Once we consider multiple groups the equivalence with SPD (1) is lost. The reason is that comparisons are made at the same level of poverty gap between different groups and not at income levels. Only if z i = z for all i does the new reference-based criterion correspond to the standard first degree sequential poverty dominance condition.
A practical way of implementing the set of dominance comparisons is to consider as reference point the poverty line z 1 which is the highest, then shift to the right the distribution functions of each group i by θ i = z 1 − z i , such that all the poverty lines now coincide, then apply the first order sequential dominance condition to the new shifted distributions.
We now consider the second order of reference-based sequential poverty dominance, which we shall link with dominance in terms of absolute poverty gap profile (APGP) curves in the next sub-section. For each k = 1, 2, ..., n,
provides the distribution of the poverty gaps in the first k groups, and the condition
¤ dt´≤ 0 for all γ > 0 can be considered as a second degree stochastic dominance condition over homogeneous populations, obtained by shifting incomes in order that poverty lines for all groups coincide and then making comparisons at all shifted income levels that by construction will be associated with the same absolute poverty gap in each subgroup. 5 The following proposition highlights the link between the RBD conditions and the poverty dominance conditions associated with the poverty indices P (.).
It is important to point out a minor difference between RBD(1) and SPD(1). The RBD(1) condition is required to hold only for γ > 0, that is individuals exactly at the poverty line are not considered. Therefore comparisons of head-count ratios are not required, instead for γ → 0 RBD(1) requires that
where H − denotes the head-count ratio evaluated making use of the "strict" definition of poverty, i.e. considering as "poor" only incomes strictly below the poverty line. This modification is due to the fact that we consider only discrete income distributions. It is possible to extend the results in Proposition 1 (part i) to comparisons between continuous distributions, in this case H − and H will coincide. 6 
Sequential Poverty Gap Dominance Conditions
As shown in Foster and Shorrocks (1988a,b,c), Spencer and Fisher (1992) , Jenkins and Lambert (1997) and Shorrocks (1995 Shorrocks ( , 1998 when poverty comparisons are made over homogeneous populations first and second order stochastic dominance for censored income distributions are equivalent to respectively rank dominance of absolute poverty gaps distributions and APGP curve dominance. An analogous relation exists between the reference-based sequential poverty conditions in the previous propositions and appropriate sequential dominance conditions for heterogeneous populations expressed in terms of poverty gaps.
.., z k ) be the vector of poverty lines associated with the first k groups, and let z * := max {z 1 , z 2 , ..., z i , ..., z n } ; given that poverty lines are ranked in decreasing order z * = z 1 . If we let
where F i (y) := 0 if y < 0, we obtain the distribution that, for any "poor" income level t in the group with the highest poverty line, identifies the proportion of income units in the first k subgroups that experience an income gap of at least z * − t. The poverty gap of the individual ranked at the p th population quantile of the income distribution F (k) , when the poverty lines are set at z k , can be written as
dt denotes the absolute poverty gap curve of the first k groups of population F , where poverty gaps in each group i are evaluated w.r.t. the group poverty
is the average absolute income gap [averaged w.r.t. the entire population] where the first k groups are merged and individuals in each group are considered poor if their income is not above the group poverty line.
We present new poverty dominance conditions for heterogeneous populations expressed in terms of the sequential absolute poverty-gap distributions γ F (k) (p, z k ). These conditions correspond to rank-dominance of the poverty gap distributions γ . We write F < SP GD(j) G to denote that distribution F dominates G according to the Sequential Poverty Gap Dominance (SPGD) condition of order j = 1, 2.
denote the population share of the first k groups in F, and similarly in G:
For SPGD(1), condition (a) specifies an adjusted rank dominance procedure over poverty gaps, taking into account that sequences of subgroups may cover different population shares, ensuring that the relative ranks considered are those evaluated with respect to the entire population. Condition (b) simply requires that the proportion of poor individuals in the k neediest groups of population F is lower than the proportion of individuals in the same groups of population G. For both SPGD(1) and SPGD(2), when dominance is evaluated at the last stage, all groups are considered and (a) implies (b), requiring either rank dominance or second-degree dominance for the whole population distributions of poverty gaps.
If the marginal distribution of needs is fixed, as in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) and Atkinson (1992) , the conditions require that at each stage k the poverty gaps, or poverty gap curves, of the neediest k groups are compared. That is, if q
k for all k, the conditions reduce to straightforward rank and second-order dominance over poverty gap distributions, SPGD(1) being equivalent to γ
and for all k = 1, 2, ..., n. At the last stage for SPGD(2), we have
That is, we recover the standard poverty dominance condition applied to homogeneous populations. This condition is not obtained for poverty comparisons over heterogeneous distributions, either in the standard approach pioneered by Atkinson (1992) or in the dual approach to sequential poverty dominance suggested in Zoli (2000) . In the former case, at the final stage of comparisons, second degree poverty dominance coincides with generalized Lorenz dominance for all incomes below the lowest poverty line (that is the poverty line z n of the least needy group). This condition turns out to be equivalent to APGP curve dominance for the unique poverty line z n . In the latter case the second degree poverty dominance is obtained through weighted averages of the APGP curves of each group evaluated w.r.t. the group poverty line.
The next proposition confirms the equivalence between the reference-based dominance conditions and the SPGD conditions. Proposition 2 RBD(j) ⇐⇒ SP GD(j) for j = 1, 2.
Given this equivalence between RBD and SP GD, we will interchangeably use their notations in the remaining part of the paper.
Variable poverty lines
Our previous results depend on the setting of an appropriate group reference level (i.e. poverty line). Although our procedure is less demanding than identifying cardinal equivalence scales to implement between groups poverty comparisons, the setting of the poverty lines may turn out to be a source of disagreement between policy makers. When agreement is not reached on the appropriate set of poverty lines, a possible solution is to make comparisons considering vectors of ordered poverty lines, each one of them defined within a range.
In general this type of comparison turns out to be problematic for the approach we follow. This is hardly surprising. The logic of our approach is based on the definition of a reference point, the poverty line, within each group, therefore once uncertainty about the appropriate value of the reference point is introduced then also the between-groups comparisons are affected. In particular, since individuals are compared between groups for a given absolute poverty gap, if a poverty line changes then the income levels that are pairwise comparable between groups change, thereby affecting all the dominance conditions! However, if uncertainty about the poverty lines takes a particular specification then it is possible to provide a clearcut result. If the poverty lines all change by the same amount, the between-groups pairwise comparisons are still made at the same income levels, the only additional implication being that potentially more individuals become poor as poverty lines increase; therefore new portions of the income distributions have to be taken into account in the evaluation; and that is all.
Suppose that every poverty line z i can be decomposed into two components, a fixed minimum levelz i which is defined and is such thatz i ≥z i+1 and a positive additive element β which is common to the evaluation of all poverty lines, that is z i =z i + β. It follows that z i − z j =z i −z j , that is, there is no disagreement on the gap between the various poverty lines of different groups but only on their absolute values. It is sufficient to check for dominance for the extreme value of the poverty line associated with the highest value of β in order to have unanimous dominance for all the intermediate values of β, as formalized in the following remark.
Remark 1 P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying properties A, A1 and A2 and for all
.n, and for all γ > 0.
It is also possible to obtain a corresponding result for properties A and A1, i.e. under the conditions in Proposition 1. In this case the dominance condition will require: P k i=1 ∆φ i (γ,z i +β) ≤ 0 for all k = 1, 2, ..., n and for all γ > 0. But neither result holds if the distances between the poverty lines are not maintained at fixed values.
Suppose now that the poverty lines are constrained only to lie in ranges,
for all i = 1, 2, ..., n − 1. Let Z n (z − , z + ) denote the set of all ordered poverty lines z 1 ≥ z 2 ≥ ... ≥ z n ≥ 0 satisfying such conditions for n groups. If poverty dominance is required to be consistent with all possible z ∈ Z n (z − , z + ), then making use of Remark 1 it is possible to restrict the set of comparisons required, most readily under the assumption that z
7 A more general algorithm associated with the case where z Zoli and Lambert (2005) . Moreover it is also proved there that when n = 2 the necessary and sufficient conditions for SPGD(j) for all z ∈ Z 2 (z − , z + ) are:
0 (x; z − , z + ) := 0 for all x, while for i = 1, 2, ..., n definê
Proposition 3 Let j = 1, 2, and z − i = 0 for all i. The following statements are equivalent:
(ii)∆
[j]
i (0; 0, z + ) ≤ 0 for all i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Suppose now that (z −
i (x; 0,z1) := max
Corollary 1 Let j = 1, 2, and z
The following statements are equivalent:
i (x) is obtained as in (8) making use of (6) .
This algorithm corresponds to SP GD of order j = 1, 2 for all ranked poverty lines in [0,z]. If j = 2 and q i = q 4 Relationship to existing welfare literature Bourguignon (1989) suggested a general stochastic dominance criterion valid for multivariate welfare comparisons where the population is partitioned into groups ranked according to family size (needs), as in this work. The criterion suggested is applied to comparisons between distributions (bounded atx) with identical marginal distributions of needs, i.e. such that q i = q F i = q G i for all i. We first show that our criterion can be considered as a special case of the one suggested by Bourguignon. Most importantly we also show that when poverty lines are allowed to change without any boundaries then SPGD(2) and Bourguignon Dominance (BD) become equivalent.
We will write F < BD G to denote that distribution F dominates G according to the Bourguignon Dominance (BD) condition.
for all i then the dominance conditions obtained in Proposition 1 (part ii) and shown to be equivalent to SPGD(2) in Proposition 2 are also equivalent to a restricted form of Bourguignon-dominance which obtains when considering only those values of x 1 , x 2 , .., x i , .., x n−1 , x n such that, for a given vector of ordered poverty lines z :
The standard sequential poverty dominance [SPD(2)] criteria we have enumerated can also be interpreted as special cases of Bourguignon (1989) 
This result holds even if we consider dominance for all poverty lines below those considered and such that the ranking of the lines is preserved.
When SP GD(2) comparisons are extended in order to take into account any ranked vector of positive poverty lines the connection with BD dominance becomes clear.
Proposition 4 If
Therefore, the numerical algorithm suggested by Bourguignon to test BD will test also SP GD (2) [z] (when q i = q (2003) , the idea of comparing the social marginal value of income at different income levels of poor individuals exhibiting different needs by looking at the poverty gaps is intimately connected with setting absolute equivalence scales. 9 We can identify a sequence of valuesθ i such that once the poverty line z n of the least needy group is fixed we get z i = z n +θ i . Recalling that we have derived θ i := z 1 − z i , we getθ i := θ i − θ n . The sequence of valuesθ i identifies the absolute equivalence scales. Property A1 imposes that the social marginal value of income in group i for a poor income unit with income x is higher than that of a poor income unit in group i + 1 with income below x + θ i − θ i+1 . These conditions are also consistent with considering comparisons of distributions of equivalent incomes obtained making use of absolute equivalence scales that are decreasing in nominal income for incomes below the poverty line. 10 Related conditions for welfare dominance based on unanimity for utilitarian evaluations over a set of absolute equivalence scales are obtained in Bosmans et al. (2009) 
We can also make an analogy with Bazen and Moyes' (2003) modification of the Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) and Jenkins and Lambert (1993) results. This requires in our setting to modify (3) and Property A s.t. u i (0) = a i ≥ 0 in order to quantify the "stigma effect" of being poor, and furthermore to assume that a i ≥ a i+1 for all i = 1, 2, ..n − 1. The dominance condition in Proposition 1 will consequently have to include
.., n. This additional requirement has been derived also in Duclos, et al. (2003) and used to supplement the SPD conditions in order to account for dominance criteria that are consistent with discontinuous poverty indices like the headcount ratio or those introduced in Bourguignon and Fields (1997) . Note that this condition is enough, when required to hold for all ordered poverty lines in [0,z], to induce the analogue of BD for comparisons based on first order dominance as obtained in Proposition 3 letting j = 1, which is equivalent to SPGD(1) (and therefore will imply SPGD(2)) checked for all poverty lines considered.
The results presented for SPGD can also be extended to consider higher orders of dominance as done for welfare comparisons in Lambert and Ramos (2002).
Intermediate Dominance
Some intermediate dominance conditions, stronger than SPGD(1) and SPGD(2), can also be devised. These will be related to conditions obtained analyzing the problem comparing individuals at income levels as in Atkinson (1992) rather than at poverty gap levels as in this paper. The approach is similar in spirit to the one adopted by Bourguignon (1989) to weaken the sequential dominance conditions in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) .
In order to get the first result we need to introduce the following condition:
Property A0 u i (γ) ≥ u i+1 (γ) ≥ 0 for all γ > 0, and all i = 1, 2, ..., n − 1.
Note that this condition is implied by A and A1, but once the Weak Monotonicity axiom WM is substituted for A1 then A, WM and A0 are independent. It is precisely the combination of these conditions that we will consider to obtain a stronger dominance condition than SP GD(1). In order to strengthen SPGD(2) we will instead consider the combination of conditions A, A1 and WPT. The latter property is clearly weaker than the property A2 used in conjunction with A and A1 to characterize SPGD (2) .
To present the results we make use of the notation adopted in Proposition 3 and consider an ordered poverty vector z ∈ Z n . Recall that ∆
i (t)dt. We consider j = 1, 2 and for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n−1 we let∆
where∆ [j] 0 (x; z) := 0 for all x, z 0 := z 1 and δ i := z i − z i+1 while for i = 1, 2, ..n we define∆
Note that the condition∆ i (x i ; z) ≤ 0 for all i and for all x i ∈ [0; z i ). These conditions require that between group stochastic dominance comparisons are made pairing an income level in a less needy group with all income levels in needier groups that are associated with the same or a lower poverty gap level.
Proposition 5 For a fixed z ∈ Z n , P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying properties A, A0, and WM if and only if∆ [1] i (0; z) ≤ 0 for all i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Proposition 6 For a fixed z ∈ Z n , P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying properties A, A1 and WPT if and only if∆ [2] i (0; z) ≤ 0 for all i = 1, 2, ..., n.
As is clear from Proposition 3 the above dominance conditions are similar to F < SP GD(j) [z] G for all poverty lines in Z n (0, z), for j = 1 and j = 2 respectively. But there is a crucial difference, the results in Proposition 3 require to make stochastic dominance comparisons between an income level in a less needy group and all higher income levels in needier groups, while the results in Propositions 5 and 6 require that these comparisons are made taking into account all income levels in needier groups that are associated with non-higher poverty gap levels. When poverty lines do not coincide between groups then the results in Proposition 3 imply those in Propositions 5 and 6 but the reverse may not be true.
Corollary 2 Consider u i satisfying property A, (i) P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying A1 and for all z ∈ Z n (0, z + ) =⇒ P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying A0 and WM for a fixed set of poverty lines z + . (ii) P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying A1 and A2 for all z ∈ Z n (0, z + ) =⇒ P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying A1 and WPT for a fixed set of poverty lines z + . If z + =z1 then the implications in both statements become equivalences.
These results are in spirit similar to the one in Bourguignon (1989) , in that the dominance conditions have to be checked for a range of values for the poverty lines, and if we require them to hold for z =z1 then we get an analogue of the result obtained in Corollary 1.
Note that A, WM and WPT can also be equivalently expressed in terms of the poverty deprivation functions p(x, z). Indeed when poverty lines are higher for needier groups then properties A, A0, and WM imply
.n−1 and for all x, and p i (x, z i ) ≥ p i (x 0 , z i ) where x < x 0 for all i = 1, 2, ..., n (see Zoli and Lambert, 2005) . Therefore if we move the perspective of the analysis back to comparisons made at income levels, and denote with A0* and A1* the version of the above axioms specified in the income based framework then the classes of poverty deprivation functions p i (x, z i ) consistent with A, WM and A0* and with A, WPT and A1* are respectively larger than those obtained in the poverty gap framework.
The dominance conditions derived imposing A, WM and A0 applying the poverty gap perspective are implied by those obtained imposing A, WM and A0* applying the income perspective. The poverty gap perspective leads to a potentially more decisive set of comparisons in that for a given income level in a lees needy group it rules out between groups comparability with levels of income in needier groups that are not lower but associated with higher poverty gap levels. If we strengthen WM with A1, then A0 is implied, but most importantly the two approaches give independent rankings. If we add WPT, again poverty gap dominance is implied by the one expressed at income levels. Finally if we strengthen the WPT requiring property A2 then the two approaches will lead to independent rankings. In order to show these results systematically we list the properties derived within the poverty gap approach: A, A0, WM, BGP, WPT and BGTP and in addition to A, WM, and WPT we will consider also corresponding properties A0*, BGP*, and BGTP* defined using the income approach as in Atkinson (1992) .
The following implications hold, if we take for granted A :
We consider all poverty indices satisfying A and compare the two approaches (income vs. poverty gap). For a fixed set of poverty lines z ∈ Z n , we get the following results :
The "income approach" and the "poverty gap approach" compared for dominance conditions derived for fixed poverty lines.
Note that once the impact of transfers on poverty deprivation is supposed to decrease as income increases (in accordance with WPT) then requiring a larger poverty reduction for a transfer taking place at the income level x 1 in group 1 with respect to a transfer taking place at x 2 < x 1 in group 2 where both incomes are associated with the same poverty gap level, does imply that the same differential condition applies also if transfers occur at any income below x 1 , therefore also for a level of income in group 1 identical to the level x 2 in group 2. For this reason our perspective can be considered to give higher relevance to needs than the standard one following Atkinson's (1992) work. It should however be noticed that the implication does not hold if WPT is not assumed.
The comparisons in Map A can be extended by weakening the previous dominance conditions, requiring them to hold when evaluated over sets of alternative ranked poverty lines. The following proposition holds:
If we consider the set of z ∈ Z n (0, z + ) and we move the perspective to comparisons made at income levels then exploiting the analogies with the framework adopted in Bourguignon (1989) it can be shown that A, A0
* and WM lead to the analogue of Bourguignon dominance for first order stochastic dominance comparisons i.e. we get SP GD (1) For all z ∈ Z n (0, z + )
The "income approach" and the "poverty gap approach" compared for dominance conditions robust to changes in poverty lines
For the special case of poverty lines defined in Z n (0, z + ) the poverty gap perspective thus provides results that generalize the Bourguignon dominance condition and turn out to be more robust than those obtained in the framework relying on poverty comparability at income levels.
Expanding the framework
As discussed in the introduction, the approaches focusing on between groups poverty comparisons implemented at fixed income levels or at fixed poverty gap levels are extreme cases of more general type of poverty comparisons. For those comparisons, given a starting income in a less needy group, a comparable income is identified for the needier group adjacent in the ranking. This income is supposed not to be lower in absolute level than the initial one and should be associated with a poverty gap that is at least as large as the one in the initial group. This procedure can be expanded to the multiple groups case taking as starting income the one obtained for the new group and considering the associated income level in the next needier group, etc.. Since incomes are supposed not to be negative, and poverty lines are decreasing according Clearly different value judgements can lead to different sets C. For instance the Atkinson (1992) approach considers the set C of all x such that x 1 = x 2 = ... = x k = ... = x n * = x where x ∈ [0, z n * ] , while for our approach the set C includes all
.. = z n * − x n * .For this general approach it is possible to identify dominance conditions that are analogous to those previously derived for fixed poverty lines. Recall that ∆ [1] i (
Definition 6 ((C)SD: (C) Sequential Poverty Dominance) For z ∈ Z n , and F, G ∈ F:
A special case is obtained when relative poverty gaps are considered in order to identify comparable incomes. In this case C includes all x s.t. x i /z i = x n /z n for all x n ∈ [0, z n ] where n * = n. This type of dominance coincides with sequential poverty gap dominance where relative poverty gaps instead of absolute ones are used.
The normative implications of these conditions can be derived simply by generalizing the approach considered in the previous sections considering evaluations based on the measure P (.) in (1) but modifying the axioms BGP and BGTP in order to consider between groups comparisons made at income levels identified in C. If we denote these modified versions of the axioms as BGP(C) and BGTP(C), then the next proposition follows by simple adjustment of the results in the first part of this paper.
Proposition 8 For a fixed z ∈ Z n and a given C. (i) P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying properties A, WM and BGP(C) if and only if F < (C)SD (1)[z] G.
(ii) P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying properties A, WM, BGP(C), WPT and BGTP(C) if and only if F < (C)SD (2)[z] G. (2005) we investigate robust poverty dominance conditions that apply, for a fixed z ∈ Z n , for all C's within a set C of admissible profiles of ranked incomes
In Zoli and Lambert
0 (x; z) := 0 for all x, while for i = 1, 2, ..n definê
One result is this:
Proposition 9 Let z ∈ Z n and j = 1, 2. The following statements are equivalent:
i (x; z) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [0, z i ) and all i = 1, 2, ..., n. The dominance condition can be made robust also to changes in poverty lines. Let δ * i := z
In particular, the following algorithm provides necessary and sufficient conditions for dominance for all ranked poverty line vectors in Z n (0, z + ).
Proposition 10 Let j = 1, 2. The following statements are equivalent:
) and all i = 1, 2, ...n.
Note that∆ * [j]
i (x; 0, z + ) is obtained as max t∈[x;,z
i (x; 0, z + ) in (6) and (7) leading to the same dominance condition as in Proposition 3 with the obvious implication that the Bourguignon (1989) algorithm follows as a special case once z + =z1. A comparison with the result in Proposition 3 makes evident that the dominance conditions (C)SD(j) [z] that are satisfied for all C ∈ C and dominance conditions SP GD(j) [z] are equivalent when are required to hold for all z ∈ Z n (0, z + ). Note that for a fixed z ∈ Z n the conditions SP GD(j) [z] and SP D(j)[z] are obtained as extreme cases of (C)SD(j)[z] when C admits respectively between groups comparability at fixed poverty gap levels or at fixed income levels. When dominance is checked for all z ∈ Z n (0, z
is consistent with a larger class of dominance conditions based on different comparability hypothesis including SP D(j) [z] . However as pointed out in the previous sections
. As a result:
Conclusions
In what respects do our results differ from the standard sequential dominance conditions derived following the approach suggested in Atkinson (1992) ? Poverty evaluations differ from inequality and welfare evaluations in one significant aspect, the existence of a threshold, the poverty line. While in general the income distributions compared for welfare and inequality evaluations are unbounded, or bounded at an arbitrary maximum, for poverty the distributions are censored at the poverty line. This process creates a reference point, which is an alternative to the origin or zero income point.
It is therefore possible to build up normative evaluation models in which comparisons are made taking distances from this reference point (see statement B in the Introduction) and not only from the origin to be ethically relevant (see statement A in the Introduction). This is the case in our model, which focuses upon poverty gaps and not incomes. When we consider homogeneous populations, once the poverty line is fixed the two perspectives coincide, but for the purpose of making between-group poverty comparisons, when poverty lines could differ for the different groups, then, as we have plainly demonstrated here, choosing incomes or poverty gaps as the relevant indicator makes a difference.
Our results have shown that APGP curves (as well as poverty-gap distributions) have a key role in making sequential poverty comparisons. In particular, the proportion of poor individuals in the society or their average poverty gap play a role in the comparisons that was neglected in the existing poverty dominance criteria for heterogeneous populations.
Appendix
Claim 1 For a fixed z ∈ Z n , P(F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying A and A1 if and only if
Proof. We show only the sufficiency part. The necessity part can be found by rearranging the proofs in Chambaz and Maurin (1998) or Zoli (2000) .
Integrating by parts in (4), we have:
where u 0 i denotes derivative w.r.t. z i − x. The second term sums to zero given that u i (0) = 0 for all i, therefore
For all u i (γ) satisfying A1, u 0 i (γ) can be equivalently defined in terms of functions ω j (γ) for j = i, ...n, as
Substituting, we have
Let γ * be the highest poverty gap level in all subgroups. After rearranging we get
It follows that, since ω k (γ) ≥ 0 for all k = 1, 2, ..n and all γ > 0, the condition
for all i = 1, 2, ..n, and for all γ > 0 is sufficient for poverty dominance.
Claim 2 For a fixed z ∈ Z n , P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying A, A1 and A2 if and only if F < RBD (2) [z] G.
Proof. Again we prove only the sufficiency part (see the proof of Claim 1). For all u i (.) satisfying A1 and A2 we have
Integrating by parts in (19) ,
Noticing that
and substituting, we get, after simplification,
from which it follows that, since both ω
for all k = 1, 2, ..n, and for all γ > 0.
Claim 3
The following conditions are equivalent:
Proof. Consider the case of an homogeneous population, with income distribution F (x), inverse distribution F −1 (p) and poverty line z. The absolute povertygap γ F (p, z) associated with the p quantile of the income distribution is γ
is the inverse of the income distribution censored at the poverty line, i.e.
The absolute poverty-gap for distributionF becomes γF (p,
11
Note that condition (i) is precisely first degree stochastic dominance betweenF andG obtained from (23) using Q
Combining the previous considerations, condition (i) is therefore equivalent to
, in addition of (iia) it has to be also that γ
That is the proportion of poor individuals in the first k groups should be at most
i (p) be the left continuous inverse distribution function of F i (x). Consider the distributions of incomes x * that are censored at the poverty line z i (i.e. x * = x if x < z i and x * = z i if x ≥ z i ). For the censored income distributions, generalized Lorenz dominance requires
The result is obtained recalling that second degree stochastic dominance is equivalent to generalized Lorenz dominance (see Atkinson, 1970, and Thistle, 1989) .
Claim 4
Proof. The second condition requires a clarification. Consider the case of an homogeneous population, with income distribution F (x), inverse distribution F −1 (p) and poverty line z. The APGP curve is PG
. Now weight the distribution using a coefficient Q ∈ (0, 1) , constructing a distributionF (x) as in (23) The APGP curve for distributionF becomes
Changing the variable to s = p/Q, we get
From Lemma 1, we know thatF dominatesG according to second degree stochastic dominance iffF dominatesG in terms of APGP curves, whereF andG could be obtained using different coefficients Q F and Q G . Once we consider the APGP curves in our approach, we face distributions of incomes (possibly of differently ranked groups) that are normalized by Q F k and Q G k at the generic stage k. The equivalence with APGP dominance is retained. Given that the procedure in which stochastic dominance is constructed does not affect the poverty gaps, we can compare PGF (p) and PGG(p) which turn out to be equivalent to the curves Q · PG F (p/Q) and similarly for G. In order to check that PGF (p) ≤ PGG(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1] it is then sufficient to check that Q
] and that PGF (1) ≤ PGG (1) .
. While for distribution G we have considered the entire AP GP curve, the associated AP GP curve for distributionG is not yet completed: we are left with a horizontal part since by construction the remaining poverty gaps are zero. Thus for p > Q 
In this case, the second condition in (ii) will also be implied:
Claim 5 Let j = 1, 2, and z − i = 0 for all i. The following statements are equivalent:
Proof. We construct an algorithm starting from stage 1 of the sequential comparisons in Proposition 1 that are equivalent to SPGD(1) and SPGD (2) . First note that letting γ = z i − x for x ∈ [0, z i ) and rearranging ∆ [1] i (x) := q 
It follows that at the stage 2 of the dominance conditions it should be ∆
Thus the dominance condition can be equivalently stated as
(Further stages) We consider the third stage where group 3 is merged with the first 2 groups. For any γ > 0 sequential dominance requires that
. Dominance for all γ ≥ z + 3 has been satisfied already in the previous 2 stages.
We follow the same procedure presented for the second stage. For any x 3 ∈ [0, z + 3 ) we derive the associated values of x 2 in group 2 and x 1 in group 1. They are, for i = 1, 2 :
with associated functions∆
For any x 3 ∈ [0, z + 3 ) we identify the set of poverty gaps that are consistent with it. Then, for any admissible value of x 2 associated with x 3 , i.e. derived by the same poverty gap once applied to an appropriate poverty line z 2 , we identify the set of associated values of x 1 .
, and the maximum x 1 is x 1 = z
The poverty gap values γ that are consistent with x 2 are given by γ ∈ (0, min{z
Thus the associated values of z 2 are given by x 2 + γ = z 2 ∈ (x 2 ; min{z
We set z 1 ≥ z 2 and identify x 1 = z 1 − γ = z 1 − z 2 + x 2 for all z 1 ∈ (x 2 ; z + 1 ]. For z 1 = z 2 we get x 1 = x 2 , as z 1 increases also x 1 increases, reaching the upper bound
To summarize: For any x 3 ∈ [0, z + 3 ] we get x 2 ∈ [x 3 ; z + 2 ), and for any x 2 in this interval, we have that x 1 ∈ [x 2 ; z + 1 ). More generally, starting from x k ∈ [0, z + k ) we get for i < k a sequence of intervals for x i given by
For k > i we construct the algorithm letting for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n − 1
i+1 (x; 0, z
for all x i+1 ∈ [0, z
0 (x; 0, z + ) = 0 for all x, while for i = 1, 2, ..., n
The derived dominance conditions require that∆ 
Claim 6 If
, for a fixed vector z and a fixed stage k of SP GD(2) we have
For any γ and z i there exists a value of x i such that
dt this is precisely the case for x i = z i − γ. As γ or the vector z k = (z 1 , ...z i , .. z k ) change there is always a vector with x 1 ≥ x 2 ≥ ... ≥ x n ≥ 0 such that the SP GD(2) conditions at stage k can be obtained as special case of BD conditions. Given that this consideration holds for any k = 1, 2, ..n then Part 1 is proved.
Part 2:
Consider BD conditions evaluated for a specific vector x 1 , x 2 , ..x n s.t.
For any x i ≥ 0 there exist a value of γ > 0 and at least a vector of ranked poverty lines z n such that x i = max {0, z i − γ} for all i = 1, 2, ..n. It follows that
and therefore the BD condition can be obtained as the last stage of an appropriate SPGD(2) condition. Given that this consideration holds for all vectors x 1 ≥ x 2 ≥ ... ≥ x n ≥ 0, we have proved Part 2.
Results for construction of Map A In order to prove the next claims we will make use of results by Müller (1997) and Castagnoli and Maccheroni (1998) valid for stochastic dominance conditions obtained as unanimous dominance for additively decomposable evaluation functionals. For expositional convenience we rephrase the results in the following Lemma adapting them to our framework. Let U denote a set of admissible deprivation functions u i , and consider the associated dominance condition F < U G if and only if P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i ∈ U. We will say that a deprivation
Lemma 2 If F < U G then the deprivation functionû i preserves < U if and only ifû i belongs to the closure of the convex cone generated by U and all constant functions.
Remark 3 Let V denote a set of deprivation functions whose closure is V * and denote by C * (U) the closure of the convex cone generated by U and all constant functions. In order to derive dominance condition F < V G it is sufficient to identify a set of deprivation functions U s.t. U ⊆ V * and V ⊆ C * (U). Condition F < U G will be sufficient to guarantee F < V G since V ⊆ C * (U) moreover, it will be also necessary since U ⊆ V * .
Claim 7 For a fixed z ∈ Z n , P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying properties A, A0 and WM if and only if∆ [1] i (0; z) ≤ 0 for all i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Proof. Necessity: we consider a set of deprivation functions that can be obtained as limits of functions u i satisfying properties A, A0 and WM, thus they belong to the closure of the set of admissible functions considered. Let
where γ i ≥ γ i−1 and α i ≤ α i−1 for all i = 2, 3, ..n (28) are considered then poverty dominance is obtained if and only if:
Letting α i = β > 0 for all i = j + 1, j + 2, ..., n and α i = α > β for all i = 1, 2, ..j
Any income level in group i is compared with all (not-lower) incomes in the lower index groups associated with the same or lower poverty gap levels. For a fixed vector of ranked poverty lines z ∈ Z n we can summarize the condition in (29) making use of the following algorithm: for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n − 1 let
where∆ [1] 0 (x; z) := 0 for all x, z 0 := z 1 and δ i := z i − z i+1 while for i = 1, 2, ..., n we define∆ [1] i (x; z) := max
Condition (29) requires that∆ [1] i (0; z) ≤ 0 for all i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Sufficiency: Making use of Lemma 2 it is sufficient to point out that the set of all u i satisfying properties A, A0 and WM belongs to the closure of the convex cone generated by the functions in (28) . Recalling that any monotonic continuous function can be derived as the limit of a series of step functions [See Chapter 1 in Asplund and Bungart (1966)], those in (28) can lead to all poverty deprivation functions that are non-decreasing in γ moreover by construction the deprivation functions of less needy groups are not above those of needier groups at each poverty gap level.
Claim 8 For a fixed z ∈ Z n , P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying properties A, A1 and WPT if and only if∆ [2] i (0; z) ≤ 0 for all i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Proof. Considering ∆P obtained in (16) we have
where ∆ i (x)] ≤ 0 for all v i (γ) satisfying A1 and WPT just substituting ∆ [2] i (x) for ∆ [1] i (x) within the proof of Claim 7. We generalize the algorithms applied in Propositions 5 and 6 introducing a vector α of parameters α i ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, 2, ....n − 1 that allow to shift at each stage i of the between groups comparisons (involving groups i and i + 1) the focus from poverty gaps (for α i = 1) to incomes (for α i = 0).
For an ordered vector of poverty lines z ∈ Z n we consider j = 1, 2 and for i = 0, 1, 2, ..n − 1 we let
i+1 (α; x; z) := ∆ 
Note that dominance conditions∆ i (0; x; z) provide the counterpart within the income approach of those derived in Propositions 5 and 6 following the poverty gap approach. Direct modifications of the proofs of Propositions 5 and 6 where income levels are substituted for poverty gap levels allow to derive the following results.
Claim 9 For a fixed z ∈ Z n , P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying properties A, A0*, and WM if and only if∆ α [1] i (0; x; z) ≤ 0 for all i = 1, 2, ...n.
Claim 10 For a fixed z ∈ Z n , P (F ) ≤ P (G) for all u i satisfying properties A, A1* and WPT if and only if∆ α [2] i (0; x; z) ≤ 0 for all i = 1, 2, ...n.
These results are essentially straightforward generalizations of the result of Bourguignon (1989).
The (horizontal) implications in Map A, can also be derived noticing that: i (0; x; z).
The reason is that if δ i > 0 then according to (33) condition∆
i+1 (α i+1 ; x; z) ≤ ∆ i (α; t; z)} which is always satisfied for all i = 1, 2, ..n if α ≥α given that x +α i · δ i ≤ x + α i · δ i .
Results for construction of Map B We derive some results summarized in Map B. We extend the results on intermediate dominance requiring conditions that are robust to changes in poverty lines, both within the poverty gap framework and within the income framework. We consider vectors of ranked poverty lines belonging to Z n (0, z + ). Next claim is an equivalent version of Proposition 7:
Claim 11 Let j = 1, 2.∆ Proof. We derive the result by induction starting from comparisons involving incomes in the first two groups and then extending the analysis to the other groups. Consider a vector z ∈ Z n (0, z + ) such that z 1 = z 2 and select an income value x 2 in group 2 s.t. x 2 < z 2 . Then, according to∆ 2 (x 2 ) should be added to the maximum of ∆ 1 (0; x 2 ; z + ) for all x 2 ∈ [x 3 + z 2 − z 3 , z 2 ). Since the condition should hold for all z 3 ∈ [z 2 ; z + 3 ] then we will have a set of ranges for the values of x 2 that are comparable to x 3 . The maximum of ∆ i (0; 0; z) ≤ 0 for all i = 1, 2, ...n and for all z ∈ Z n (0, z + ).
These are the (horizontal) equivalence relations in Map B.
